Casual Rock Concert Events

by Mick Upton

(updated  31st August 2007)

Keywords: simulating people, simulating crowds, simulating crowd dynamics

Abstract

This paper considers risk assessment for casual rock concert events held at temporary sites. A quantitative approach to risk assessment is reviewed and an argument is made that in order to establish an accurate risk assessment for these events it is necessary to adopt a combined quantitative and qualitative approach to risk analysis.

Current practice

A mandatory requirement to conduct a risk assessment for their work activity is often a cause for confusion among concert promoters that regularly invite large crowds to their events. This confusion is caused by the fact that there is no clearly defined method available to indicate how a risk assessment should relate to the often illogical actions of people. The more informed promoter will consider a quantitative approach to risk identification.

 John Fruin (1993), a specialist in pedestrian planning in America, has used the acronym FIST to summarise a quantitative approach to risk assessment: 

• Force: An estimation of pressure loads created by a crowd by a calculation based on density.

• Information: The sights and sounds affecting group perceptions: signs, announcements, staff training and ticket systems.

• Space: The practical working capacities of entry gates and lane systems, viewing areas, corridors, ramps and stairs.

• Time: The different degree of crowding that can be expected during the longer period of ingress compared to the shorter post performance egress.

From engineering and mathematical perspectives then, risks are objective, as such all crowd activity i.e. ingress, attendance and egress, can be broken down into separate measurable parts. The results obtained from measurements enable risk factors to be produced, which in turn can be transposed to indicate high, medium or low risk for a particular activity. A quantitative method can therefore illustrate a scientific approach to risk assessment when making an application for a Public Entertainment Licence (PEL). The flaw in this method is that it only identifies risks presented to the crowd by a system design, it does not identify those risks that might be created by the crowd in the form of cultural activity. In the case of casual rock concert events, crowd cultural activity can be a particular problem due to the fact that crowd members will happily engage in relatively risky activities without fear because they been conditioned to accept these activities are perfectly normal cultural behaviour. In such circumstances risk cannot be viewed as objective, it becomes subjective, i.e. the probability and magnitude of risk only exists in the mind of the beholder. When attempting to predict the actions of a highly excited mass of people this paper supports the view of Toft (1996) who argued that it is not possible to take objective measurements of the risk caused by people actions as one would a physical phenomenon. For a fuller understanding of this argument it is necessary to consider rock cultural behaviour in more depth.

Rock culture

Rock culture emerged from America during the mid fifties. From the start it was promoted as an anti establishment youth culture. As one newspaper report claimed:

“Police were called to five cinemas in London and surrounding districts last night to deal with excited young people creating disturbances during the film Rock around the Clock. … As the tempo grew faster they left their seats to dance in the gangways”  ( Daily Telegraph 1956).

Throughout the fifties and early sixties crowd problems at concerts were mainly confined to over excited fans, serious problems began however during the mid sixties with the emergence in the UK of a youth subculture popularly referred to as `energy rock`. Energy rock was typified by the Rolling Stones who deliberately designed their stage act and dress style to be the antithesis to the Beatles `beat culture` clean cut image that appealed predominantly to female fans. The Stones audience was predominantly male and Fuller (1981) records that during the Rolling Stones 1965 European tour "Audiences were beginning to go berserk wherever the new high energy rock was being played”.     

Inevitably their reputation for causing disorder restricted the number of venues willing to accept the Rolling Stones. Band member Keith Richard remembers how low stages at ballrooms invited stage invasions:

“ There was a period in England when we couldn't play ballrooms anymore because we never got through more than three or four songs every night, man. Chaos. Police and too many people in the places, fainting"         (Richard 1981)

The problem of stage invasions was addressed in the late sixties by moving concerts from ballrooms with low stages to theatres that had an orchestra pit in front of the stage. This move in itself did not solve the problem entirely because some determined people still attempted to reach the stage by climbing over the pit. One solution to this problem was to station a team of security people in front of the pit but this did not always work. By the seventies new de-mountable front of stage barrier (FOSB) systems had been introduced which allowed pit teams to work inside the barrier and concerts moved back to concert halls. As the demand for concerts grew, more complex FOSB systems were introduced to control crowd activity at outdoor events. 

In 1974 the American actor/singer David Cassidy played to 30,000 young people at the White City Stadium, London. The event had a FOSB system that was considered adequate to control the activity of a crowd of that size. During the show it was estimated that 500 people were extracted from the crowd because they were in distress. Thirty of these were taken to hospital, twenty-nine were released that night, fourteen-year old Bernadette Whelan remained in a coma however for four days before she died (Upton 1995). The question that many people now asked was, had concert events reached a point where they had become unmanageable and therefore dangerous?

Fatal Incidents

With the benefit of hindsight it is now possible to assess the level of risk presented by major casual concert events. The following data is the result of research for the period 1974 - 2002. It is not intended as a definitive list of fatal incidents that have occurred at concert events. It is merely illustrates the level and type on incidents that have occurred in similar circumstances in countries thousands of miles apart. The list includes both indoor and outdoor venue types, the common link being that none of these fatal incidents have been fully explained. Consequently they have all been regarded as being caused by the crowd itself due to panic or irrational behaviour.

Incidents such as fire, where it is known that fire exits were locked, and public disorder, are not included here on the grounds that the root cause of the incident was established therefore preventative measures can be taken during planning for future events.  

Preliminary analysis of research data indicated that one hundred thirty-two people have died at concerts during the period 1974 - 2002, in the following circumstances

• 31    during ingress

• 25    at front of stage

• 13    falls        

• 58    during egress

• 4      during egress from a public appearance by a group at a shopping mall

• 1      Stage diving

(Detailed in appendix A)

 Medical evidence obtained from reports into these incidents indicates that the victims were not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The verdict in all cases was accidental death. As medical evidence is obviously only available for the victims the possibility that incidents might have been triggered by other persons that were under the influence of either alcohol or drugs cannot be entirely ruled out. 

It might be reasonable to speculate that a pedestrian system failed during ingress incidents due to a lack of understanding of crowd dynamics. Similarly, egress incidents might be viewed in the same light. An acceptance that ninety-three deaths might be explained by systems failure nevertheless still leaves us with the fact that there have been thirty-eight unexplained deaths in similar circumstances, in countries thousands of miles apart.  With the exception of the one incident of stage diving, these incidents fall broadly into two categories: highly excited crowd behaviour in front of a stage (crushing) and, highly excited crowd behaviour in the upper levels of a purpose built venue (falls).

In order to gain a better understanding of the causes of these unexplained incidents this research then focused on rock concert events from the emergence of the sub culture termed `Nu metal`.  Nu metal emerged in the late eighties as a subculture of Punk rock. By the mid nineties it had established itself as a fusion of black culture (Rap and Hip Hop) and new wave rock. Possibly the first indication that the culture brought with it serious crowd control problems was at the 1994 Woodstock, U.S.A. festival. The press at the time reported that there were four thousand people treated by first aid, of which two hundred and fifty people required treatment by the on site hospital.  Many of these injuries were bruises, bloody noses or broken bones thought to have been caused by cultural behaviour (Ambrose 2001).

Cultural behaviour

Nu metal rock culture has its own language for cultural activity, for example: Moshing, Skanking, Crowd Surfing and Stage Diving (see appendix B for explanation).

Any of the above activities can create localised high density, dynamic or lateral surging or a crowd collapse, yet the crowd regard these conditions as being perfectly normal. Support for this argument was found in an Internet message by a female fan that wrote of her experiences at a concert given by the group Violent Femmes in 1997, as follows:

“…anyway, I was elbowed in the nose and some girl who was falling from surfing grabbed my ear and another girl pulled out two of my earrings. I fell and some guy landed on top of me, kneeing my right cheek as he landed, and sitting on my chest. He looked down and was so embarrassed and he just said, `I`m sorry`, I was like `that’s O.K, can you get up"… (Website)

This same young woman goes on to reveal that after the concert she had: difficulty in breathing, 2 x ½inch bruises on her arm, a bruise on her hip that measured 4 inches by 3 inches and her ribs hurt when she took a deep breath. In addition to which she had difficulty in driving as she had lost the use of her right arm! Nevertheless she enjoyed her experience and could not wait to do it again.  

It was not possible to check the accuracy of this account, however it was consistent with interviews and observations conducted at concert events as part of this research.

Conclusions

It is not suggested here that a quantitative approach to risk analysis should be dismissed, rather that a second level of analysis be introduced in order to predict the likely psychology of the crowd and the cultural activity that might be expected at contemporary rock concerts.

Young people that attend concert events, some as young as twelve years old, are being conditioned prior to the event by a variety of means that include records, T.V. advertising, promotional videos/DVD and fan magazines, to accept dangerous activities as normal cultural behaviour. At the event, sophisticated sound and light systems and the often-irresponsible actions of performers then trigger activities by a crowd mass that are extremely difficult to control.

A current move to overcome concerns for crowd safety at casual concert events by the introduction of a `Safety Officer` is unlikely to solve the problem. Unfortunately the management of crowds is not recognised as a social science therefore no qualification for the role is available. Promoters and/or local authorities are attempting to overcome this problem by employing the services of either a retired police officer or a person who has had the benefit of health and safety training. In over forty years of working with crowds however I have never met a police officer that had been trained in proactive crowd management, the police service generally trains for a crowd control role. Similarly, health and safety training focuses on an industrial view of safety, issues such as crowd dynamics and crowd psychology are not taught.

The problems of crowd safety management at temporary sites will not be solved therefore until it is recognised that a Crowd Manager and a Health Safety Officer (HSO) are two entirely separate, but equally important, roles. The Crowd Manager should be responsible for designing a crowd management plan and then focus on command and control of the event. The HSO should adopt a broader role in monitoring contractor work practice during the build-up, event day(s) and de-rig.

Recognition of this twin role concept would of course require the introduction of specific training for crowd management, but unless this step is taken risk assessment for casual rock concerts will continue to be based on pure speculation or informed opinion.

References

Ambrose J. 2001: White Riot - Woodstock `99 in Mosh Pit Culture - The violent world of mosh, p 23: Omnibus Press

Daily Telegraph 1956:`Rock & Roll` Cinemas Call Police p118 in, The Daily Telegraph - A Unique Chronicle of the Decade - The Fifties: Ed Holloway D.: Simon and Schuster Ltd 1991.

Fruin J 1993: Prevention of Crowd Disasters by Crowd Management P104 in Engineering For Crowd Safety: Ed Smith & Dickie: Elsevier

Fuller G.J. 1981: Are The Kids All Right?:   Part two p52: Times Books

Richard K. 1981: in Part two Are The Kids All Right p58: Ed Fuller G.J.  Times Books

Toft B. 1996: Limits to the Mathematical Limits of Modelling of Disasters p101 in Accident and Design: Ed Hood E.D. & Jones D.K.C.: UCL Press

Upton M. 1995: Death of Bernadette Whelan in, Principles of Good Crowd Stewarding: unpublished seminar paper presented to, Lessons From Crowd-Related Emergencies: Emergency Planning College Easingwold 7.9.1995.

Website

http:/members.tripod.com/ms17sierra/music/vfemmes.html

Appendix A

 Total = One hundred thirty-two victims

·       F.O.S. indicates front of Stage.

·       *Indicates egress related

·       PA crush indicates an egress from a public appearance by an artiste at a shopping mall.

Appendix B

Moshing:

A term used to describe what seventies Punk Rock culture called slam dancing. A dance ritual during which people literally slam into each other. Although moshing looks violent it is not intended to be. The act of moshing generally takes place in the `mosh pit` This term is used to describe the general area that moshing takes place and should not be confused with the front of stage primary pit. A mosh pit can start spontaneously anywhere in the crowd and should therefore be regarded as an activity not a place. 

Crowd Surfing:

Where people are lifted above a crowd and they roll their bodies over the heads of the crowd. Normally a surfer will move toward the stage with the intention of climbing onto the stage to stage dive. People have been known to actually bring surfboards into a show for the purposes of crowd surfing.

Pogoing:

Originally a seventies dance ritual during which people literally jumped up and down on the spot, often giving gladiatorial salutes. The activity is still popular with a range of rock culture crowds.

Skanking:

Originally Skanking was also a term for slam dancing, the term is now more likely to be used to describe a  mosh pit activity where a circle forms within a crowd. The crowd then moves in a circular route while they continue to slam into each other. In some respects the circle resembles a North American Indian war dance, or in extreme cases, like a whirlpool. The size and duration of this rotating circle is dependent on the number of people drawn into it.

Stage Diving:

Where a performer or fan dives from the stage into the crowd. The intention is then that the crowd will support that person above their heads while they crowd surf.